![\"\"](\"https:\/\/armando.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/12\/10082014-1.jpg\")
Almost \r\nat the same moment, the Chinese vessel Shi Long Ling reached the main port of \r\nVenezuela. Saharawi phosphate, essential for the agrochemical industry, is being \r\nimported regularly by companies of the Venezuelan State, which pays for it to \r\nMoroccan suppliers. <\/p>\n\n\r\n\n
The last ship \r\narrived two weeks ago<\/A>, but this is not an isolated case. Marine Traffic, \r\nExactEarth and other databases of maritime transit around the world place \r\nVenezuela among the destinations of vessels departing from Laayoune, the capital \r\nof Western Sahara, controlled by Morocco -the occupant- and from whose port bulk \r\ncarriers loaded with phosphate ship.<\/p>\n\n\r\n\n On \r\nAugust \r\n1st 2012<\/A>, 22,000 tons of phosphate rock from Western Sahara were unloaded in \r\nVenezuela; on November \r\n9 of that same year<\/A> another shipment of 24,200 tons was received and last \r\nyear 59,560 tons came in, on two ships that arrived on January 17 and then on May 12, \r\n2013<\/A> in the docks that the National Armed Forces reserve in Puerto Cabello, \r\nthrough the Coordinating Office of Maritime Support of the Navy \r\n(Ocamar).<\/p>\n\n\r\n\n The \r\nbill of landings states that Pequiven, Bariven and other companies of the \r\npetrochemical consortium of the state import phosphate from Western Sahara. Thus \r\nit is reflected in the port registers with place of origin in \"Laayoune, \r\nMorocco\", despite the fact that the United Nations (UN) has been condemning in \r\nvarious declarations the extraction of natural resources from this territory, \r\nand that the national government stands for the independence of Western Sahara. \r\nSo much that President Hugo Ch\u00e1vez always declared himself defender of the \r\nSaharawi cause.<\/p>\n\n\n In \r\nsilence, far from the news outbreaks in Gaza, Syria or Ukraine, a war of varying \r\nintensity has been waged in Western Sahara for almost 40 years. When Spain left \r\nthat colony in 1975, neighboring Morocco annexed the territory, which it claimed \r\nas a province of the former Great Morocco<\/I>. Their expansionist ambitions \r\novershadowed the desire for freedom and self-determination of the native \r\npopulation, the Saharawi people. The so-called Frente Polisario (acronym \r\nin Spanish of Popular Liberation of Sagu\u00eda el Hamra and R\u00edo de Oro<\/I>) took \r\nup arms against the Moroccan occupier, to whom neither the United Nations nor \r\nthe international community has recognized any sovereignty over Western Sahara. \r\n<\/p>\n\n\n The \r\nUN has repeatedly condemned both the occupation and the extraction of resources \r\nfrom the Saharawi people in a series of resolutions and pronouncements. In 2002, \r\nthe Corell Report - named by the then UN undersecretary general for Legal \r\nAffairs, Hans Corell - warned about the \"exploitation and looting\" of the \r\nterritory. <\/p>\n\n\r\n\n At \r\nthe heart of the conflict is the struggle for control of the rich phosphate \r\ndeposits of the territory. The Spanish prospection made the first discoveries of \r\nthe mineral in 1947. In 1963, the Bou Craa mine was developed, one of the \r\nlargest in the world. Morocco is by itself, the largest exporter of phosphates \r\non the planet. From their exports, estimates \r\nof El Economista <\/A>calculate that about 1.75 billion dollars a year originate \r\nfrom deposits that are located in occupied Saharawi territory. \r\n<\/p>\n\n\r\n\n Also \r\nsince 1975 the Saharawi struggle became a famous cause of the international \r\nleft. There is no progressive event without a declaration, such as the recent \r\nPSUV Congress.<\/p>\n\n\r\n\n In \r\n2004, Hugo Ch\u00e1vez himself received Mohamed Abdelaziz, president of the \r\nproclaimed Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), and five years later, in \r\n2009, he sent the ambassador of Venezuela in Algeria, Hector Michel Mujica, to \r\nfulfill the formalities of presenting his credentials in the Saharawi refugee \r\ncamps that remain in Tindouf and other areas of southwestern \r\nAlgeria.<\/p>\n\n\r\n\n Mujica \r\nreiterated Venezuela's support \"to the right of self-determination of the \r\nSaharawi people and the constitution of an independent state\", which a week \r\nlater triggered the closure of the Moroccan embassy in \r\nCaracas.<\/p>\n\n\r\n\n Like \r\nChina with Tibet or Taiwan, or, at the time, Indonesia with East Timor, the \r\nKingdom of Morocco does not recognize the Polisario or any other group as \r\nrepresentative of the Saharawi people, and sees with apprehension any nation \r\nthat does so.<\/p>\n\n\r\n\n Morocco \r\nlamented that Venezuela did not take a more neutral stance on the matter of the \r\nSahara and accused it of hostility. \"The Caracas authorities have actively \r\nparticipated in the belligerent campaigns of the adversaries of the national \r\nunity and have compromised, in that absurd escalation, the highest Venezuelan \r\nspheres\", concluded the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of that country in a \r\nstatement released by the official MAP agency on January 15, 2009, the date on \r\nwhich it closed its representation in Caracas and moved it to the Dominican \r\nRepublic.<\/p>\n\n\r\n\n \"The \r\nopening and presence of a representation in a country reflects the will to \r\nstrengthen relations with that country in different areas, but this presence is \r\nuseless when major considerations hinder the development of those relations\", \r\nthe Moroccan Foreign Ministry added.<\/p>\n\n\r\n\n Ch\u00e1vez \r\ndid not speak on the matter, nor did the now President Nicol\u00e1s Maduro, who then \r\nserved as chancellor. Reinaldo Bol\u00edvar, vice-minister of foreign affairs for \r\nAfrica, was in charge of the reply. He expressed surprise because, according to \r\nhis testimony, he had not received any call to anticipate any inconvenience in \r\nRabat. While noting that the kingdom of Morocco had the right to shut down its \r\nembassies anywhere in the world, he judged \"the Moroccan speculations as \r\ntendentious and disrespectful, about Venezuela financing and participating in \r\nwar campaigns against that \r\ncountry\".<\/p>\n\n\n There \r\nwas no more of that impasse<\/I>. But even in the midst of the dispute, and \r\neven later, several ships left their wake in the Atlantic while transporting \r\nphosphate expelled from Western Sahara to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, \r\nthe spirited ally of the Saharawi insurgency. However, \r\nDaha highlights the support Venezuela has given to the Saharawi liberation since \r\n1982, when Caracas recognized the SADR as a sovereign country. The Bolivarian \r\ndiplomacy has gone further: on September 17, 2011 inaugurated, in partnership \r\nwith Cuba, the Sim\u00f3n Bol\u00edvar School for more than 350 students of 4 wilayas, as \r\nthey know the refugee settlements that were established in a region of Algeria. \r\n<\/p>\n\n\r\n\n That \r\nof Western Sahara is a forgotten conflict, not longer quite bloody but with \r\ncomplex implications. The internationalist Julio C\u00e9sar Pineda, who approached \r\nthe case when he served as Venezuela's ambassador to Libya, believes that \r\nMaduro's government should be prudent. \"The issue is delicate in the commercial \r\nscope because it is a strategic mineral, but in the diplomatic sphere it is \r\nregrettable that Venezuela has broken the balance that it had always maintained \r\nand that ended with the closure of the Moroccan embassy\".<\/p>\n\n\r\n\n For \r\nPineda, the conflict has been prolonged in a kind of cold war between Morocco \r\nand Algeria, around which the Diaspora of the Saharawi people has taken place. \r\nNot counting the dispersed population in exile, the Saharawi total more than \r\nhalf a million people spread across the occupied territories and a series of \r\ncamps located in almost unknown areas of the Sahara desert. <\/p>\n\n\n The \r\nquality of Saharawi phosphatic rock is recognized all over the world. It is \"a \r\nyellow to light brownish-colored mineral with scarce fossils - some remains of \r\nfish and coprolites - and without organic matter, consolidated only by a \r\nclayey-loamy cement that allows its disintegration with ease and, consequently, \r\nits subsequent treatment\", describes the \r\nmagazine of Industrial Technique of Spain in its edition of June, \r\n2004<\/A>. \r\n The \r\nSpanish company FMC Foret, one of Tripoliven's shareholders, was criticized in \r\nthe past for purchasing phosphatic rock from Western Sahara to Morocco. A \r\nreport from the Ethics Council of the government of Norway <\/A>in 2010 he called \r\nattention to this firm, which recognized without embarrassment the purchase of \r\nthe mineral and its willingness to maintain imports from Layounne, on the \r\nunderstanding that, in its opinion, Morocco was legally and de facto the \r\nadministrator of the territory: \"The company's plant in Huelva, Spain, is \r\nheavily dependent on access to the quality phosphate found in Bou Craa\". \r\n<\/p>\n\n\r\n\n But \r\nthe Huelva plant closed in 2010. FMC Foret reported that the closure had nothing \r\nto do with the exports from Western Sahara, which, in any case and since then, \r\nwere stopped. <\/p>\n\n\r\n\n Regarding \r\nits investments in Venezuela, where Saharawi phosphate shipments continue to \r\narrive, the Spanish FMC Foret indicated, in a \r\nreport delivered to the Securities and Exchange Commission <\/A>(SEC, the U.S. \r\nstock-exchange supervisor), that it maintains an uncontrolled investment in \r\nTripoliven's business valued at nine million dollars by September 30, \r\n2012.<\/p>\n\n\r\n\n According \r\nto the Council of Ethics of the Norwegian government, \"Morocco's exploitation of \r\nthe phosphate resources of Western Sahara constitutes a major violation of the \r\nrules. This is not only due to the \r\nfact that the local population is not receiving the benefits; but the current \r\nform of exploitation also contributes to maintaining an unresolved situation \r\nand, consequently, the presence of Morocco in a territory over which it does not \r\nhave sovereignty\".<\/p>\n\n\n Tripoliven \r\nwas created in 1972 and began operations in 1977. Since then, according to \r\nNicol\u00e1s Mar\u00edn, president of the board of directors, the company buys phosphate \r\nrock from Morocco for its production. For Mar\u00edn, the resolutions of the United \r\nNations (UN) are a matter of another level that would not correspond to his \r\ncompany to define. Tripoliven \r\nprocesses around 100,000 tons of phosphatic rock in Venezuela every year, most \r\nof which is bought from Morocco - including that of Saharawi origin - and its \r\nproducts serve as supplies for the country's detergent \r\nindustry.<\/p>\n\n\r\n\n Mar\u00edn \r\nnotes that they have never received a complaint from the UN, but remembers that \r\nthey were once contacted by a non-governmental organization. It was Western \r\nSahara Resource Watch (WSRW) which, from its headquarters in Norway, points out \r\nthat the response \r\noffered <\/A>did not mention Western Sahara: \"Regarding your request for \r\ninformation, we comply in informing you that Tripoliven is not importing rock \r\nfrom the company OCP. FMC Foret is one of Tripoliven's partners, holding 33.33% \r\nof the total shares\", informed the Venezuelan company to its Norwegian \r\ninterlocutors.<\/p>\n\n\r\n\n The \r\norganization, with representation in 38 countries, defends the preservation of \r\nthe resources of the occupied territory for the use of the Saharawi people. \r\n\"Half of the population of Western Sahara has fled the territory following the \r\nbrutal Moroccan occupation\", says Erik Hagen, president of WSRW. \"They live in \r\ndeep poverty in refugee camps and do not earn a single penny from this trade. \r\nThe income that Moroccans obtain from it is used to finance and entrench the \r\ncostly occupation\".<\/p>\n\n\nCh\u00e1vez took a stand<\/h2>\n\n\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/armando.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/12\/10082014-2.jpg\")
Solidary, but not so much<\/h2>\n\n\n
The Saharawi ambassador in \r\nCaracas, Mohamed Salem Daha, warns that \"any exploitation of the resources of \r\nthe Sahara without the authorization of the Saharawi is illegal\". He is unaware \r\nof phosphate imports for this part of the Caribbean. He assures that he has \r\nnever heard about the subject but does not fail to point out, if that were the \r\ncase, that those who trade in phosphate, fishing, oil and sand extracted from \r\nWestern Sahara fuel an endless conflict with disappeared persons, antipersonnel \r\nmines and the construction of a 2,700-kilometer wall that divided the \r\npopulation. <\/p>\n\n\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/armando.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/12\/10082014-3.jpg\")
The rock of discord<\/h2>\n\n\n
Despite the international provisions calling into question the \r\nextraction and commercialization of products from Western Sahara under Moroccan \r\ncontrol, the Moroccan government company \"Office \r\nCherifien des Phosphates (OCP)<\/A> \r\n\" exploits the phosphate mine in Bou Craa, occupied territory, through its \r\nsubsidiary Phosphates de Boucraa S.A. (Phosboucraa).
Morocco is one \r\nof the main exporters of the mineral, which arrives in Puerto Cabello through \r\nits state-owned companies Phosboucraa and OCP, as can be read in the reports of \r\nthe Puerto Cabello Chamber of Commerce. At least five ships, between 2012 and \r\nJuly 2014, have unloaded 137,260 tons for Venezuelan state-owned companies \r\nPequiven and Bariven - the latter, in charge of Pdvsa's international \r\nacquisitions. In the rest of the world, Saharawi phosphate customers are usually \r\nprivate companies. In Venezuela, Pequiven and some of its subsidiaries, such as \r\nTripoliven, process Saharawi phosphate in their plants for the production of \r\ndifferent chemical products, such as fertilizers and detergents.
The \r\ncountry imports phosphate from Africa because it does not exploit most of the \r\nmines it has in the states Falc\u00f3n and T\u00e1chira. \"Venezuela, despite possessing \r\ndeposits that could cover the national demand, has the need to import phosphatic \r\nrocks, with the consequent loss of foreign currency\", explains the geologist \r\nFrancisco Ra\u00fal Garc\u00eda. \"If the known deposits of phosphatic rocks are put into \r\nproduction, we could shortly cover the national demand and even export surpluses \r\nto neighboring countries\".
Tripoliven, which has among its shareholders \r\nPequiven, Valqu\u00edmica and the Spanish private company FMC Foret, admits that it \r\npurchases the mineral from Western Sahara to Morocco. Nicol\u00e1s Mar\u00edn, president \r\nof its board of directors, maintains that it is a transparent operation. \"The \r\nrock that is more in line with the requirements of Tripoliven is that of Bou \r\nCraa, imported from Morocco\", he explains. The Saharawi mine, according to \r\nfigures from the OCP, on average produces and exports between 2.3 and 2.5 \r\nmillion tons per year, a little less than ten percent of the whole Moroccan \r\nphosphate production. Mar\u00edn notes that the projects for the exploitation of \r\nphosphate \"made in Venezuela<\/I>\u201d are under development: \"Logically, when the \r\nproduct is available on the market, we will look for it here\". \r\n<\/p>\n\n\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/armando.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/12\/10082014-4.jpg\")
Technicians against politicians<\/h2>\n\n\n
\"These issues are unrelated to the normal \r\noperation of Tripoliven. I don't know how it's being handled, but we prefer to \r\nstay out of that\", he says. In the meantime, no government agency has shed \r\nany light on the matter: Pequiven and Bariven, both state companies, did not \r\nrespond to the request for an interview to address this issue until the date of \r\nthis publication. <\/p>\n\n\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/armando.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/12\/10082014-5.jpg\")
The trail continues to Colombia<\/h2>\n\n\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/armando.info\/wp-content\/plugins\/pdf-generator-for-wp\/admin\/src\/images\/PDF_Tray.svg\")
<\/span><\/a><\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"