A Giant Septic Tank is Swallowing Maracay and Valencia

The amount invested over 13 years in Lake Valencia in north central Venezuela, could have been used by the Chavista regime to build 18 new hospitals like the Cardiológico Infantil Latinoamericano de Caracas, (Latin American Children’s Cardiology Hospital) or a fairway like the Panama Canal. But against the flow of the 385 million US dollars dumped in the water, the basin has become the largest septic tank in Latin America. This is one of the most serious environmental problems in the region, not only because of the pollution but also because of the social cost of 8,000 families who are at risk of losing their homes and even drowning in sewage. Before addressing this situation, the regime of Nicolás Maduro prefers to help the victims of Hurricanes Harvey and Irma, and leave the neighbors abandoned to the eternal Venezuelan improvisation.
Este reportaje se encuentra disponible también en:
The
first lines of Guillermo Saavedra's poem are the leitmotiv of this story: "Calm
is the water of misfortune." Calm was the standing water of Lake Valencia and
the misfortune has descended with a definite certainty on the families that at a
bad time decided to buy homes in the neighborhoods of its basins. The people in
La Punta and Mata Redonda know it. Back in the 1980s these areas presumed to be
middle-class developments and today are two large open-air sewers. Spacious
houses surrounded by standing water, some abandoned and others invaded. In La
Punta, the area closest to the lake, there are only 12 houses left from the
original 500. The others were demolished after their owners were
compensated.
Before
arriving there, it is necessary to pay attention to the details that announce
that, in a few years, La Punta and Mata Redonda and ten other developments and
neighborhoods will be the Venezuelan version of Atlantis, the submerged
continent. A row of lamp posts gets lost in the distance. They appear smaller,
sink as they get far away. They are 10 meters (32.80 ft) high, but submerged in
water, they look much smaller. There is no inclined street or broad plain that
explains that. Lake Valencia, in addition to avenues, hectares of estates and
entire communities, has also swallowed the
lighting.
chevron_leftDesliza la imagen para ver máschevron_right
zoom_inHaz click sobre cada imagen para ampliar
In
the north-central region of Venezuela is the second most important lake in the
country, Lake Valencia (also known as Lake Los Tacariguas), sharing its 3,140
square kilometers (1,212.36 square miles) with the states of Aragua and
Carabobo. In the first case, the city of Maracay (capital of the state of
Aragua) is the closest to the lakeside deposit. The entire residential area at
the south of the city is accustomed to see the same and desolate image. The
sunken light posts remind us how far Lake Valencia has
advanced.
The
same happens in Brisas del Lago, where there are only two out of 15 streets of
the development. The corners of the streets are flooded and only 10 houses are
still occupied by their owners. In Aguacatal II, calle Paraíso is the last
street that remains in the area since 2012 because until then, there were still
remnants of three more neighborhoods that kept those streets away from the lake.
The story repeats in Paraparal, where an asphalt wall was built to separate the
community from the now flooded scrubland and where over 10 years ago, La Vaquera
neighborhood (420 houses) existed, which also disappeared under water. Also, Las
Vegas 1 is a virtually deserted place since 18 families were evacuated due to
the advance of the water, and now live in Olinto Mora Márquez school, a
"temporary shelter" in which they have been for 7 years, and where the water is
already half a meter (19.68 in) high in one of the classrooms that was used as a
room until July.
chevron_leftDesliza la imagen para ver máschevron_right
zoom_inHaz click sobre cada imagen para ampliar
In
Mata Redonda and La Punta there is no submerged public lighting that reminds us
the rise of the lake level, but a 1.2 km (0.74 mi) long embankment located 4.40
m (14.43 ft) above their houses, so that people do not to forget that there is
that great landlocked water reservoir above. Lake Valencia is a closed
(endorheic) basin, which receives 360 million cubic meters of wastewater each
year, e.g. sewage from residential and industrial areas of the cities of
Maracay, Valencia, and towns like Mariara , San Joaquin, Los Guayos, and Güigüe,
in addition to the 22 rivers that flow into the lake, and the seasonal
rains.
chevron_leftDesliza la imagen para ver máschevron_right
zoom_inHaz click sobre cada imagen para ampliar
Re-emerging News
While
Nicolás Maduro's regime offered aid to the islands and cities devastated by
Hurricanes Harvey and Irma in the Caribbean and the United States, Venezuelans
remembered the old tragedy of these areas adjacent to the stinking lake.
Fernando Klein can confirm it, who under the doorjamb of the main entrance of
his house —located on calle A, manzana 3, six meters (19.68 ft) below the level
of the lake— looks like the last of the Mohicans of La Punta. His is one of the
twelve houses still standing. His house (273 m2/ 2938.55
ft2) was built at a height of 408 m (1338.58 ft) above sea level, and
currently the lake is 414.10 m (1358.59 ft) above sea level. He continues there
with his wife and daughter, awaiting compensation from the Government, which
they are entitled to by judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ). The
question is, if the Supreme Court has never ruled against the government and it
is a prestigious ally in the design of a model that guarantees chavismo a
perpetual rule, why has the regime not honored the
decision?
The
court proceedings of this case began in November 1999, a few months after the
commander-in-chief Hugo Chávez came to power. The lawsuit filed by the
group of owners of both developments claimed the failure of the Ministry of the
Environment to discharge his duty to carry out the drainage of Lake Valencia.
The favorable ruling could also be seen as a form of revenge against the
condemned governing class preceding the Chavismo from 1958 to 1998. At that time, the
expansion of the lake was already affecting the locals. Klein recalls that when
they bought that house in 1979, the lake was about 10 kilometers (6.21 mi) away.
In 20 years, the lake knocked at their doors and in 2005, it was already 2 m
(6.56 ft) above La Punta and at the same level as Mata
Redonda.
chevron_leftDesliza la imagen para ver máschevron_right
zoom_inHaz click sobre cada imagen para ampliar
The
Government's solution to this emergency situation —expressed by decreeing and
declaring "potential areas of high risk"— was to build a 1200-m (3937-ft)
embankment, where only a section of
4 m (13.12 ft) wide of the wall is
concrete (the lower part extends for 21.5 m (70.53 ft)), built to protect a
pumping plant that dumps a thick flow of wastewater to the lake. It was erected
like some sort of a dam to stop the advance of water, 412 m (1351.71 ft) above
sea level. It was a solution designed to last for three years. It will be twelve
years in October.
That
concrete wall serves as a reference to the 8 thousand families of at least seven
areas of southern Maracay that are at risk of being covered by water, since the
level of the lake already is above their houses. In 2012, they add 2.40 m (7.87
ft) to the wall, remaining at a height of 414.40 m (47.24 ft) above sea level.
In August 2017, in the face of an evident flood they began to add 1 additional
meter (3.28 ft) to the wall. If water cannot pass by the wall with the waves, it
progressively passes below, through the earth, or through the sewer pipes and
drains.
chevron_leftDesliza la imagen para ver máschevron_right
zoom_inHaz click sobre cada imagen para ampliar
Pending Compensation
The
512 family owners that remain in La Punta and Mata Redonda have not been
evacuated despite the risk decreed on them. Since 2006, when the TSJ finally
issued the decision of the lawsuit filed in 1999, delivering a constitutional
guarantee to protect the rights of the owners of La Punta and Mata Redonda, they
must have been compensated. That is provided for in judgment 1632, ratified in
2007 with judgment 1752, but not all owners have been compensated, 512 out of
1043 still wait.
Klein
and Marianelly Nieves, who owns a house in Mata Redonda, recall that many left
for compensation, but others decided to appeal to a settlement. Each owner
accepted the terms agreed upon with the Government, which were different from
the provisions of the judgment, e.g. house appraisal and payment. It included
from houses in the secondary market to apartments of the government housing
program “Gran Misión Vivienda.” Others, like them, were left behind without an
answer. It has been like this since 2010.
In
2015, the TSJ issued a third judgment, where it was agreed once again on the
execution of 2006 and 2007 judgments, and ordered to pay the payments pending
from the 2011 settlement. The decision is in the hands of a collection court in
Maracay, but the owners have not been compensated yet. "We already exhausted all
legal resources, according to the book. What is happening is an inhuman
omission, a human drama that goes beyond legal. There are areas that are worse
today than La Punta and Mata Redonda ever were in 1999, when the lawsuit was
filed," says lawyer José Vicente Haro, counsel for 65 families of La Punta and
Mata Redonda.
chevron_leftDesliza la imagen para ver máschevron_right
zoom_inHaz click sobre cada imagen para ampliar
Those
who remain in these communities are certain that there was corrupt activity in
the resolution of hundreds of cases. Most know who ended up paying extra money
to experts, public officials, or intermediaries to obtain compensation,
expedited check issuance, or overstated appraised value.
Fernando
Klein took care of the proceedings for his compensation in 2008. He refused to
pay the person in charge of his case, and when he received the long-awaited
check, there was an error in the name of the recipient. There was no way to fix
it. They had already seen a house that they could buy in another distant area
with the compensation and a credit, but everything collapsed due to that
error.
"If
they had not filled that lake, we would live happily here. This was going to be
my home for life and now we have four feet (13.12 ft) of water above. We were
swindled and the Government has not done anything. They are waiting for nature
to do the dirty work and has treated us terribly," says Marianelly Nieves. She
affirms it after two years of receiving drinking water only twice a week, having
no street lighting, no garbage collection, patrolling, dredging of Madre Vieja
river, or maintenance. It is as if no one lives there, hence, there are no
utilities to provide. It is as if they play tired and wait for the owners to
make the decision to leave without being compensated to save their lives before
the risk of drowning.
"They
know that any money invested here would be lost, because we are in flood areas.
That is why they left Mata Redonda, La Punta and all the communities that are at
high risk for the lake," says Mildred Rojas, inhabitant of La Esmeralda, another
area flooded with sewage. In her opinion, the problem of Lake Valencia has
become the petty cash of all local and regional rulers, a cleaning budget item
where many charge and nothing is cleaned.
While
in La Punta and Mata Redonda the compensations stopped, in Aguacatal, Paraparal
and Brisas del Lago the governorship of Aragua decided to declare these areas,
since 2012, as "shelters in the open," a paradox. Their houses flooded with
sewage are the safe place where the Government orders them to stay. "They say
that there are no shelters, no homes, no money, nothing," repeated the neighbors
of Paraparal. In late August, civil protection officials went to the area to
offer a survival course on how to evacuate the area and what to do in case of
floods. The same happens in Aguacatal II. Doctors stay away from the area fearing a sewage related
infection.
chevron_leftDesliza la imagen para ver máschevron_right
zoom_inHaz click sobre cada imagen para ampliar
It
is also a contradiction that the inhabitants of south Maracay live with their
homes, streets and avenues flooded with sewage that you can see, smell and feel,
and at the same time, they endure a water rationing that only lets them collect
a few liters a week, a kind of "rationing" to try not to affect the levels of
the lake, which continues increasing.
Even
the Yuma tourist center in the state of Carabobo, where Hugo Chávez held one of
his Sunday programs in April 2005, and promised to clean Lake Valencia in five
years, is now under water.
chevron_leftDesliza la imagen para ver máschevron_right
zoom_inHaz click sobre cada imagen para ampliar
An Old Problem
"This
is not new. It dates back to over 30 years ago," says engineer Jesús Castillo,
director of “Agua Sin Fronteras” (Water Without Borders) organization, when explaining what is
happening with this body of water, which since 1999 has the neighbors of Maracay
and Valencia in a state of emergency.
"We
have always turned our backs on the lake, because instead of regarding it as a
great economic, agricultural and tourist opportunity for the region, we use it
as a big toilet that receives all the wastewater of the cities and industries, "
he concludes, apologizing for the comparison.
The
basin of Lake Valencia gave a turn from the decade of the '80s, when the urban
and industrial expansion was promoted. Much of its land intended for agriculture
was developed with Government permits. The region grew, became one of the
economic and industrial development areas and attracted thousands of
Venezuelans, who decided to make their living in these central cities, at just 2
hours from Caracas. At some point, they represented a 13% of the inhabitants of
Venezuela, recalls Castillo.
But
like any development process, it required parallel work to mitigate its impact
on the basin. That is the debt. The lake turned into an environmental, health,
economic and social problem, consisting of at least 12 residential areas drowned
in its water, seven communities of Maracay (around 8 thousand families) in high
risk, two judgments of the Supreme Court of Justice disobeyed , six emergency
decrees ignored, 8000 productive hectares under water, and 14 cleaning works
planned and financed, but not executed. Those who live in the vicinity of the
lake basin are engaged in a disproportionate struggle: they are alone against
nature and against the Government’s
indifference.
Only in Latin America
In
the late '70s, Lake Valencia or Los Tacariguas had a height of 401 m (1315.62
ft) above sea level. Based on this reference, the Venezuelan Government began to
grant permits to build houses on lands by the basin, south of Maracay, while the
Ministry of the Environment set in 1978 the maximum security or stabilization
level of the lake at 408 m (1338.58 ft) above sea level, recalls Germán
Benedetti, a mechanical engineer and former legislator of the state of Carabobo.
At that time it was already known that the water of the lake could reach that
level.
The
housing developments planned by the Government began to be executed on land
above the 408-m (1338.58-ft) level, as is the case of La Punta development,
located at that height, and Mata Redonda development, built at 410 m (1345.14
ft) above sea level. But there were also other constructions that disregarded
that level and built houses in lower lands.
To
meet the needs of the population that began to grow along with the urban and
industrial development of the lake basin, from 1975 to 1978, the building of the
Central Regional System I and II took place, an aqueduct necessary to provide
drinking water to the central region of Venezuela, which like every aqueduct
also entails the generation of wastewater. That is how all those sewers began to
be drained into the lake.
According
to Benedetti's calculations, this aqueduct dumps about 8500 l/second of
wastewater into the lake since then. In 1978 the course of the stream of river
Cabriales was taken to the reservoir and ended up as wastewater with an
additional 1500 liters per second. In total, 10,000 liters per second arrive at
the water reservoir and combine with the stream of another 21 rivers, rain
discharges, and another important volume of about 16 m3(565.03
ft3)/second from the Pao-Cachinche reservoir located in the state of
Cojedes, also in central Venezuela. Its purity ceased to be an attribute and its
natural balance, when using its waters for the irrigation of the agricultural
hectares of the basin, began to alter.
"What
is happening with Lake Valencia is one of the most serious environmental
problems in Latin America, both because of the contamination of its waters and
the social cost of increasing its level," said Castillo of “Aguas Sin
Fronteras.”
After
receiving much and discharging nothing or very little, the height of the Lake of
Valencia progressively increased. In 1999, it reached 408 m (1338.58 ft) above
sea level for the first time since 1894, says Benedetti —taking as a reference
the book by Alberto Bockh, El desecamiento del Lago de Valencia (The
Drying of Lake Valencia), and began to register the first displacements of
families affected by the flood of the lake, especially in popular areas and
invaded lands, without further reaction from local and regional
governments.
The
water of the lake began to cover streets and avenues, the sewage - at times -
were returned by the pipes of the houses, filtered through the floor and
sprouted through the sewers. A rarity that became routine, a routine associated
with the rainy season (in Venezuela is usually from May to November), and a
recurrent scenario that has worsened along with the increase in lake levels in
the last 18 years.
chevron_leftDesliza la imagen para ver máschevron_right
zoom_inHaz click sobre cada imagen para ampliar
"When
it rains, I cannot flush the toilet because it returns," says Betty Carrero, who
lives in the La Esmeralda area. Merly García reports the same from Aguacatal II.
"All this is wastewater, plain and simple shit," says Judit Bandes in Paraparal,
one of the most affected areas this year by rains, overflowing sewers and rising
lake levels.
The
area has been flooded for almost two months. On September 5, a neighbor died.
The 36-year old man was riding a horse helping to take household equipment and
furniture from a house. The animal stepped on a live wire underwater and both
died electrocuted. "This is sewage with a little of lagoon water," Mrs. Bandes
explained.
The
effect of Lake Valencia in Paraparal has been so significant that in 2013 a wall
was built to prevent the lake from affecting them again, as they lived a
critical moment in 2012. "That year, they told us 'All Paraparal must leave'
because the sewage had already mixed with the clean water in the pipes. Look
where we are now,” says Belén Arcano. The wall, built by state oil company
PDVSA, was not finished.
This
community is in Monseñor Feliciano parish, an area that has lost a third of its
territory to the advance of the lake, including 420 homes in La Vaquera
neighborhood, five schools and three health centers, says engineer Jesús
Castillo. In addition to La Vaquera, the residents of Paraparal have witnessed
the disappearance of other nearby communities: Platanal, Las Casitas, Armando
Reverón, and five blocks of Paraparal. They were evacuated between 2005 and
2010, and the land was taken by the water hyacinth brought by the
lake.
"I
have lived here for 36 years and it pains me to lose my identity because some
rulers do not want to do anything. Because this is not about losing your stuff
or your ID card in this water, but losing the identity for living here," says
Bandes, a bachelor of nursing with graduate studies, who could buy her house in
the '80s, when she was working at an outpatient clinic. Paraparal was planned by
the National Housing Institute (Inavi).
Millions Spent but not Evident
There
is an explanation for the wastewater returning through the drainage, sprouting
from the sewers and being mixed with the drinking water and the
lake.
In
1995, a technical study was conducted by Caltec-Otepi-CDM consortium, for the
Ministry of the Environment with the support of the Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB), which explained "the most advisable options to control the levels of
Lake Valencia."
Among
the three options presented was the construction of a tunnel through the Henry
Pittier National Park (north of Maracay), and open a mouth of the lake to the
Caribbean Sea. It was not accepted due to the environmental impact that would
cause to the park, Castillo and Benedetti
explain.
The
most accepted option, which has been in progress for over 20 years, is the "West
Alternative": the construction of 17 water treatment plants in Lake Valencia
basin. Only three were completed between 1995 and 1997, Los Guayos, La Mariposa
and Taiguayguai, the first two in the state of Carabobo and the third one in
Aragua.
The
Los Guayos plant stopped working in 2016 and is currently dismantled because its
equipment has been stolen, and flooded by the lake of Valencia and the water
hyacinth. La Mariposa, aimed to treat the lake water to transfer 5600 l/second
to the Pao-Cachinche reservoir (one of the lake's few releases), stopped working
in August, said Marino Azcárate, president of the Engineers Association of the state of Aragua, and
the Taiguayguay plant is abandoned. There is no way to clean this
water.
A
wastewater collection network
should be built in Maracay together with these plants, so that they
divert sewage to these treatment plants and the other 14 plants to clean the
water and transport it, if possible. But the network has not been completed
either.
An
audit conducted in 2009 by the Comptroller of the State of Carabobo on the
environmental management of Lake Valencia basin specifies that from 1999 to
2009, only 93 km (57.78 mi) of marginal collectors were built; hence, only 51
percent of the sewage was connected to the plants. In this case, the works were
part of the "Project for Lake Valencia Clean Up and Level Control," approved in
2005 to be executed in 4 years. It was meant to be ready in 2009. Such works had
already been approved in 1999 to be built in five years. They were not executed
neither recalculated.
From
1999 to 2009, the Venezuelan Government invested Bs. 747,766,208.14 in plans,
programs and projects aimed at solving the environmental problem of Lake
Valencia basin, as per the report of the Regional Comptroller. That amount is
equal to US $ 343,337,829.36, and if you add up the amounts approved from 2009
to 2012, it totals US $ 385 million, e.g. with the amount invested in 13 years
Chavismo could have built a fairway, like the Panama Canal, or 18 new
hospitals, like the Cardiológico Infantil Latinoamericano
hospital.
There
are millions spent but not evident in improvements, because the lake level has
continued to increase since 1999, when it reached the maximum security level
(408 m/1338.58 ft above sea level).
In 2005, it reached 410 m (1345.14 ft) above sea level, and 413.43 m (1356.39
ft) in 2012, two years with the most important emergencies recorded due the
water rising, which all the south of Maracay remembers. Now, 2017 could end as
another year to remember because of a new emergency in
progress.
As
the wastewater collection network
has not been completed and neither the 14 water treatment plants, the
sewage in Maracay has not stopped draining the lake. When the level rise, the
pipes that come out into the lake have been below, thus causing a submerged
discharge, explains engineer Castillo. Since the pressure of the lake is greater
than the pressure of the wastewater from the pipes, it prevents them from being
discharged, so they return. This is what the inhabitants near the lake are
experiencing, but also those who live farther away, who, even though they do not
see the water knocking at their doors, are affected anyway, as they cannot flush
the toilets because they overflow.
Hence
the sewage floods, covered by a 20-40 cm (7.87-15.74 in) high green carpet of
lemna that have been affecting the families of Paraparal, Aguacatal, Brisas del
Lago, Las Vegas and Mata Redonda for two months. With the heavy rains of 2017,
rivers have overflowed because, as if it were not enough, their courses cannot
reach the lake to drain because its level is too high. This is what has happened
since July with the Madre Vieja river, which flows near Mata Redonda and La
Esmeralda, and with the Sudantex spillway bordering Aguacatal. Both rivers
receive sewage.
chevron_leftDesliza la imagen para ver máschevron_right
zoom_inHaz click sobre cada imagen para ampliar
Disappeared Crops
The
level of Lake Valencia could lower if its waters, even contaminated, irrigate
the sugarcane crops. As it has to go through an industrial process for sugar
production, there is no risk that the wastewater affects the end
product.
"Cane
is the cheapest option to save the lake. It is a strategic cultivation in
controlling the lake level because it is a high water consumption plant,"
explains Rafael Chirinos, an agronomist, former director of the Cane Growers
Society of Aragua (Socaragua).
However,
since 2009, the production in the lake basin declined with a decree prohibiting
planting sugarcane in 53,000 ha (130,965.85 ac) between Aragua and Carabobo,
coupled with threats of farm expropriation that led several cane growers to
change fields. The decree was intended to use these lands to harvest other
foods, like tomato, onion and pepper, and include them in the “Soberania
Alimentaria” (Food Sovereignty) plan. According to experts, that was a serious
mistake because horticultural products cannot be irrigated with the wastewater
of Lake Valencia since they are direct consumption food and do not go through an
industrial process.
The
project was not executed. Three years later, in 2012, decree 8844 provided for
an article that required increasing the crops of high water consumption in the
basin of Lake Valencia. But no more sugarcane has been cultivated because there
are no resources to do it.
In
the case of Aragua lands located in the basin, the hectares for harvesting
decreased from 11,000 (27181.59 ac) to 3000 (7413.16 ac). As sugarcane
production declined, the lake level increased, becoming evident in 2011 and
2012, when another emergency occurred.
In
2011, since the levels of the lake had risen 3 m (9.84 ft) after the drop in
production, Socaragua proposed to the Ministry of Agriculture to plant 3100 ha
(7660.267 ac) of sugarcane within a 3-year period. They got no response. On
their own initiative, explains Chirinos, a group of sugarcane growers decided to
implement the plan, and they have planted 1000 new hectares on their own, but in
order to reach 3100 hectares they need a 5-million dollar support from the
Government.
Meanwhile,
and progressively, hundreds of hectares of sugarcane located in the basin of the
lake bordering with the state of Carabobo have been lost by rising water levels.
The most affected in this state, unlike Aragua, is precisely the agricultural
lands and the roads.
Finca
Montecristo, a farm in the municipality of Los Guayos, is an example. It went
from having 40 ha (98.84 ac) 20 years ago to only 2 ha (4.94 ac), because 38 ha
(93.90 ac) are under the waters of the lake. Two decades ago they were planting
40 hectares of sugarcane. But eight years ago, they were forced to change their
field because it is not profitable to grown low quantities of sugarcane, said
Carlos Delgado, in charge of the farm. It is a final tragedy. Even if a miracle
occurs and the water level decreases, farming will no longer be possible in these
lands.
chevron_leftDesliza la imagen para ver máschevron_right
zoom_inHaz click sobre cada imagen para ampliar
Andrea
Wulf tells us in her book “The Invention of Nature” that in 1800, Alexander Von
Humboldt developed his idea of human-induced climate change precisely at Lake
Valencia. Back then, when he met the lake during a visit to the valleys of
Aragua, the locals told him that the lake level was falling fast, and that they
feared that there was an underground river. After observing its ecosystem,
Humboldt concluded that the lake level had fall due to the felling of the
surrounding forests and the diversion of the waters that used to feed the lake
to irrigate the agricultural fields. What would Humboldt say now if he were to
find Lake Valencia under the current conditions?
Photos:
Cesar David Bracamonte / Patricia Marcano